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Using data from the Panel Study of IncomeDynamics and a
proprietary sample of semi-skilled productionworkers, this paper
investigates the reasons for the discontinuousincrease in wages
associated with graduation from high school.
Associated with graduation fromhigh school, we find a
discontinuous decrease in a worker'spropensities to quit or be
absent. However, we do not find thathigh school graduates have
a comparative advantage on production jobsrequiring more training,
nor, in the PSID sample, are high school graduatesassigned to jobs
requiring more training. Finally, we find that thewage premium
associated with graduation from high schoolvanishes during severe
slurips, periods in which employers are likely to behoarding labor and
in which quits and absences are leastimportant to fins.
We conclude from this evidence that thesorting model of education
provides a better explanation for the higherwages of high school
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Using data from the PSID and from aproprietary data set of newly hired
production workers, we investigate whether the discontinuousincrease in earnings
associated with graduation from high school is dueto unobserved attributes that
are correlated with both completion of high school andperformance on jobs. This
correlation is a basic assumption of sorting models ofeducation.
We find that high school graduates have lowerquit propensities and rates of
absenteeism than would be expected from their otherdemographic characteristics
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(including any continuous effects of education).' 2 On the other hand, they do not
have jobs requiring more training than would be expected from their demographic
characteristics, nor do they appear to have a comparative advantage on more
complex jobs.
Thus it appears that the discontinuous increase in earnings associated with
graduation from high school is due to traits such as stick-to-itiveness or a low time
discount rate that were acquired prior to 12th grade and that increased the
likelihood of the individual completing high school. We found no evidence that the
higher earnings of high school graduates were due to their superior cognitive skills.
i.p. H. Mirves and E. E. Lawler calcu]ated that the total cost of turnover of bank tellers was
85timesas large as their daily earnings plusbenefits. Hence, if graduationfromHigh School
decreases a workers probability of quitting during their first year on the job by 10%, and
assumingtheaverage work yearwas 240days, H.S.graduation would increase earnings of
newlyhired bank tellers by 3.5%.
2. Mirves and Lawler also estimatedthatthe total cost of absenteeism for a sample of 160 bank
tellers wasmorethan twice thecost in salariesandbenefits.Thusif, as we estimate,H.S.
graduationresults in a 14% decrease in the percentage of days absent, then we would expect the
negative correlation between absenteeismandeducation to lead to a 2% higher wage for H.S.
graduates working as banktellers.
-
Allen (1981) used the 1972-73 Quality of EmploymentSurveyto calculate theeffectof wages
on absenteeism. He foundthatthe elasticity of the absence rate with respect to marginal wage
ratevaries from-.35 to -.48. Sincethese elasticitiesstem from partial derivativeswecan not
directlyimputetheelasticity of wageswithrespecttoabsenteeismfromthe inverse of Allen's
estimates. However his results suggestthat if,aswe estimate, high school graduates are absent
14%less that would be expected from their other demographic characteristics, then these
differences in absenteeism could explain the entire wage premium received by high school
graduates. On the other hand, Allen's estimated coefficients are likely to be biased toward zero.
leading to overestimates of the effect of absenteeism on wages.
Allen also finds a negative, albeit minor, effect of high school graduation on absenteeism.
However, since he includes wages as an independent variable in his absenteeism equation, the
model being estimated is substantially different from ours-in which we are investigating the
effect of education on wages. (If high school graduates are paid more because they are absent
less, one might find that then including wages as an independent variable in the absence
equation would obscure the relationship between high school graduation and wages).-3-
Consequently, we conclude that some of the conventional estimates of rates of
return to secondary education (those that do not include dummy variables forhigh
school graduation) are capturing the effect of traits thatwere unlikely to have been
learned in secondary school.
1. THE DATA
The data for this study comes from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), with which the reader is presumably familiar, and from a proprietary data
set consisting of the personnel files of 2,920 newly hired semi-skilled production
workers employed by a high wage, unionized firm at three widely separated
geographic locations: labeled A, B and C.
Each of these data sets have advantages and drawbacks. The PSID has two
disadvantages. First, it does not have a direct measure of output, or a good
measure of absenteeism. Second, since education typically affects job assignments
and promotional opportunities it would be difficult, it not impossible, using the
PSID to determine whether lower quit rates of high school graduates are due to
their job assignments or to unobserved attributes particular to the individual.
The main drawback of the data derived from personnel files is that it is suspect
to serious sample selection biases. That issue shall be addressed on pages 10 and
11 of this section and at greater length in section 4. Let us first describe in detail
the proprietary data used in this study.
Each of the workers in this sample was initially paid the same non-linear-4-
piece-rate. When a worker achieved 83% of' expectedoutput for one month, the
worker was assigned to a pay group. All the members ofa pay group received the
same pay. Pay was proportional to the output of the group —theaverage group
size is 126 members —andpromotion opportunities were insignificant, so there was
little financial incentive for group members to achieve high levels ofoutput.
Consequently, we only used the output of workers during their first month on the
job in this study. (Among experienced workers, the range in output from the
bottom to top deciles was less than 20% of the mean).
Almost all workers were assigned to a pay group within their first three months
on the job, and the lower bound on earnings of newly hired workers was 65%ofthe
wage in a pay group, with earnings rising less than proportionately to output up to
a ceiling at 83% of the pay group wage. Therefore, expected lifetime earnings
differences among the newly hired workers at each location were trivial.3
For each worker data were available on sex, age, marital status, education,
employment status when the worker applied for work, and an estimate of the time
required for an average employee to learn the worker's job as well as the worker's
3.Because in our sanip]e wages are independent ofperformance, we were able to avoid thesample
selection biases present if a worke(s wage were included as an independent variable. If
employers value a low propensity to be absent or to quit or a high level of productivity, then
workers who have those qualities (or are perceived by employers as more likely to have those
qualities) will receive higher wages and more training. Hence if the wage were an independent
variable the error term in a quit, absenteeism, or productivity equation would be correlated with
the wage variable and hence with all other independent variables that are correlated with wages.
Although all the workers at each location in our sample received the same wage, they obviously
did not have the same alternative opportunities: the effect of differences in alternative
opportunities is discussed below.-5-
output per hour (measured in physical units and normalized by the industrial
engineering force to be equivalent across jobs), number of days absent, number of
occasions absent,4 whether or not the workerquit and the date a quit occurred.
The workers did not know that they were thesubjects of an empirical study. All
the data were routinely collected either by the personnel office, industrialengineers,
or foremen at the three locations. Although the total sample contained 2,920
individuals, complete data were not available for all workers. Insome cases
workers were assigned jobs for which there were no measures ofjob complexity, in
other cases the worker failed to answer all the questions on theapplication form.
Also at each location different information was available in thepersonnel records.
In location C, race data was not available and only the screws half of the Crawford
Physical Dexterity Test was administered; in the other two locations both the pins
and screws sections of the dexterity test were administered beforea worker was
hired.5 The scores on this test were used by the firm indeciding whether to hire the
worker, but were not used in assigning workers to jobs. Job assignments were
random.
An additional problem arose at location C: the plant was divided into two
halves, with significantly different promotional opportunities. Unfortunately the
data did not reveal to which half of the plant particular workers were assigned,
4. Consecutive days absent are recorded as a single occasion of absenteeism.
5.The Crawford Physical Dexterity Test is a two-part test. In the first part an individual uses a
tweezers to place pins into sleeves in a pegboard. In the second part small screws are screwed
into sleeves in the pegboard. Each part of the test takes three minutes and the number of
operations performed in that time is tabulated.-6-
that initial assignment may not have been random. At thatplant, workers assigned
to more complex jobs had better promotional opportunities. Because of these
unobserved differences in promotion opportunities, therelatively small sample size
at that location, and the missing data on race, prior experience, employment status
when they applied for this job, and scores on the pins section of thedexterity test,
we did not use data from that location in estimating the quit equations below.
Table I presents some summary statistics which provide a context within which
to evaluate the data. NA denotes data that were not available.
Insert Table I about here
Because this data set contains direct measures of three aspects of productivity:
output per hour. absenteeism (both percentage of days absent and occasions
absent), and quit propensity, it is possible to separately measure the effects of
education for each of those aspects of productivity. In addition, because the data
includes a measure of the complexity of the job to which the worker was assigned.
one can estimate whether better educated workers have a-7-
comparative advantage on more complex jobs.6
Insert Figure 1 about here
Before showing how the data provides information on the relative contributions
of the sorting and learning aspects of education to earnings, we first examine the
effect of education on earnings for some of the workers in our sample, and discuss
whether conclusions drawn from this subsample are applicable to a broader
population.
At plant A job applicants were asked their wage at their most recent job and
whether or not they were currently employed at that job. Using that data, we
estimated the effect of an additional year of education on the previous pay of those
workers who were employed when they applied for their current job.7 8Column3
6. In general, studies that rely on productivity measures of experienced workers within a given job
classification are subject to important sample truncation biases. For example, suppose that
education has a positive effect on performance within a given job, and that, as Medoff and
Abraham find, education (and performance) have positive effects on a worker's probability of
being promoted. Then among workers within a job classification, (i.e., workers who have not
been promoted) education could be negatively correlated with performance even though
education increases the performance of workers on the job. These effects can be seen in
Figure 1. The downward sloping line is the criterion for promotion from job I to job 2. lIthe
distribution of perceived productivities were the same at all education levels, and were a
symmetric increasing hazard rate distribution, such as the normal or uniform, then on both jobs
the better educated workers would be the less able. This problem does not arise for our data
since none of the workers were promoted. (Note that this sample selection bias does not affect
the substantive point made by Medoff and Abraham that within a sample of workers on the
same job wages rise with experience despite productivities falling with experience. We are
simply pointing out that in jobs in which there are significant promotional opportunities it is
difficult to infer the direct effect of experience or education on productivity.)
7. We excluded unemployed workers from the sample since the wage on their previous job, one
which they either couldn't keep or chose to leave, does not seem representative of their expected
earnings. In each case wages at the previous job were used since wages for experienced workers
on their current job are a function solely of seniority and the output of the relevant pay group.
8. Obviously this is a biased estimate of the effect of education on earnings for workers in the
population —theworkers in our sample chose to leave the jobs for which we have recorded their-8-
of Table 2, contains estimates of the effect of various demographic variableson the
logarithm of the previous hourly wage of workers at that plant. Columns I and 2
reproduce the coefficients estimated by Wesley Mellow using the 1979 current
population survey.
Insert Table 2 about here
Table 2 can be used in various ways depending on how ambitious we wish to be.
First, the estimates of6 In sage
provide a measure of the effect of education on 8 educ
the earnings (in their previous job) for the subsample of workers for whom we have
earnings data. We used that estimate as a standard, and then calculated how
much of that effect can be explained by the partial correlation between education
and various aspects of performance for workers in that limited sample. This
approach does not make any assumptions about the sample being representative of
a larger population, but simply seeks to find those factors that contributed to
earnings differences on previous jobs for workers within this subsample. We
assume that performance on current jobs is correlated with wages on previous jobs.
We also assume that workers for whom usable pay data were available are
representative of workers in the sample, so that a year of education has
approximately a 4% effect on the hourly wage on other jobs for the workers in this
earnings. In section 3, we analyze the effect of this bias.-9-
sample.9 Including high school graduation asan independent variable we found
that for the workers in our sample completion ofhigh school had 2 to 3 times as
great an effect on wages as did completion oil I th or 1 3th grade.
A second use of the data in Table 2 is to providea partial check of the
importance of sample selection bias for our sample if one wishes to generalizeour
results outside our sample. Since our major concern is inexplaining the positive
correlation between education and earnings, it is useful to check tosee if the return
of education in our sample is biased. This is a potentially seriousproblem because
one would expect that better educated individuals who apply for these jobs are less
representative of their schooling cohort than are less well educated workers.
However, the estimated value of the return on education for workers for whomwe
had wage data is roughly the same as returns estimated using the C.P.S.sample.
Thus it does not seem that our sample differs from the C.P.S. sample inways that
grossl' distort the effect of education on earnings, in addition, the sign of the
effect of race, sex, education, tenure, and experience on the logarithm of thewage
is the same for our sample as for the randomly selected C.P.S. sample.
The personnel practices at these plants also provide grounds for believing that
our sample is representative. Only 22% of applicants whose applications were
reviewed were rejected. Of those. 859kwererejected because of a low score on the
Crawford Physical Dexterity Test. Our estimation procedures included the
9. We had usabte data on previous pay for 77% of the workers employed at themidwest location
(thoseworkers comprised 43% of the entire sample).10 -
worker'sscore on the dexterity lest as an independent variable, thus eliminating
that potential source of sample selection bias. In addition, the average pay increase
for workers for whom we had wage data was 103%, and workers waited more than
36 hours in freezing temperatures to receive job application forms. This evidence
indicates that the firm was paying above market wages, reducing the sample
selection problems derived from more "able" applicants not applying to the firm.
where ability refers to unobserved worker characteristics that are correlated both
with observed characteristics and with productivity.10 These high wages and the
concomitant excess supply of job applicants were routine features at the
manufacturing locations of this unionized firm. At another location of this firm
recall notices were recently mailed to former employees: 90% of those who had
found alternative work quit their jobs to return to work for the firm. Consequently
we have assumed that sample selection biases were small and have not corrected
for them) I
10. Of course some residual sample selection bias occurs if unobserved attributes that lead workers
to wait on line longer, such as the ability to withstand the cold, are correlated with both
performance measures and with observed attributes we are studying. At the location A we know
the individual's place on line. It was uncorrelated with any of our measures of performance.
Consequently, we have assumed that this source of bias is small and have disregarded it.
11. Alternatively we could have used the Bloom and Killingsworth (B-K) procedure to correct for
sample selection bias. (Because the characteristics of excluded observations are unknown, the
standard Heckit correction can't be used.) However, the B-K procedure is extremely sensiuve to
assumptions about the distribution of the error term in the selection equation. Indeed, as they
point out, the equation being estimated is only identified if the assumed distribution of the error
term of the selection equation is nonlinear. See Olsen (1982) and Muthén and Jöreskog (1983)
for discussions of this issue.-Il-
2.MODELS
Typically anindividual's choice of a level of education is a function of both
observable and unobservable traits. The traits that are observable for oursample,
and that affect the schooling decision, includeage, race, sex and manual dexterity.
We grouped together under the rubric "stick-to-itiveness" all the unobserved
attributes that affect an individual's choice of a level of schooling. Stick-to-
itiveness represents the combined effect on schooling level of characteristics such as
self-discipline, desire for variety, and susceptibility to illness or to the urge to '1take
a day off." Years of schooling, and high school graduation are used as proxies for
the traits referred to as stick-to-itiveness.
In addition to representing these unobserved characteristics, education also
indicates a level of training. We would expect that one skill that is acquired in
school is the ability to learn complex tasks. Of course, that skill may have been
acquired prior to the years of schooling across which our sample differs (almost the
entire sample had at least nine years of education) and influenced the individual's
choice of a level of education. We assume that skills such as ability to learn
complex tasks that affect the productivity of workers and that may plausibly have
been learned in secondary school were learned there. That is, we intentionally
biased our analysis in favor of a learning explanation for the correlation between
education and earnings.
The performance equations we estimate are: whether or not the worker quit
during his first six months on the job, absenteeism (both days absent and occasions- 12-
of absenteeism), and output per hour during the first month on the job as a
fraction of his expected output given the complexity of the job.(These
normalizations are routinely performed by the industrial engineering staff aspart
of their efforts to compute the piece-rate for different jobs.) The critical
independent variables for our analysis are years of education, H.S. graduation, job
complexity, and a measure of the "match" between education level and job
complexity.
Match[education -mean(education)] times
[job complexity -meanjob complexity)].
Job complexity was defined as the logarithm of the number of weeks the plant's
industrial engineering staff estimates it should take a new employee to learn the job
(achieve the average productivity rating for the factory on that job). The main
component in the industrial engineers' calculation is the number of times per week
an experienced worker performs the task.
In general we would expect stick-to-itiveness (those unobservable traits which
lead individuals to choose higher levels of schooling) to have its greatest effect on
quit propensity and to have a lesser effect on other aspects of behavior such as
absenteeism. On the other hand, one direct effect of education is to improve
alternative opportunities. increasing the probability of a quit.
2.1 Quits
LetSdenoteworker i's present value of his current job, J. denote i's present
value of his best opportunity elsewhere, and M.denotei'smobilitycosts (both real- 13-
and psychic) of a job change (housework and leisure are countedas jobs). Assume
worker i is risk neutral and quits if and only if
(1)
Denote the time discount rate of workers by r, worker i'sage at the start of the
observation period by a1 and the value of an individuals alternative andpresent job
at time r by V1 (r) and S (r) respectively. Then, assuming male workers anticipate
working until they are 65 years old, and normalizing r0 for the time when the
quit decision is made
65—a,+50F
(2) P.—S = 5 e' E(r) —S(i)]di.
whereF is a dummy variable indicating whether a worker is a female, andis an
estimated parameter of the problem. If females anticipate working feweryears.
<0.Next, let p1(i) represent the probability individual i changes jobs after the
observation period and before period r, and let the value of that new job be a
weighted average of the value of the previous job and some constant term B.
Assume that the values of the alternative and the present job grow at an
exponential rate so that
(3a) V1(r) =e" F(o)+ p1(r)(y(0)+ (l—)Bt(O)J
(3b) S1(t) =eU?[1—p1n S(O) + p10)(y51(0) + (l—-r)B1(O)J
where 0 <y<1.Then, defining o =(r—u)and a1 =I—(1—y)p1(r),worker i





To obtain an estimable quit equation from (4), assume:
(5) aV(O) X]31





byg(a,ô,j30F), and substituting (5)-(7) into (4),





Clearly, the net gain from changing jobs, the left hand side of (8), will be
measured with error. We assume this error term, denoted PQ. is distributed
normally with zero mean and is i.i.d. Therefore, the quit equation we estimate is
I if g(a,óJ30F)[X1,81 —X2i32]—X3fi3 >
(9)
0 otherwise
The worker characteristics that we measured and that affect alternative
opportunities include education, race, sex, age, geographic location, dexterity, as
measured by scores on the physical dexterity test, and employment status when
hired (a worker who was on a temporary lay-off from a desirable previous job
might be likely to quit when recalled from the layoff).'2 The factors affecting
12,One mighi argue that employers should be concerned with the total effect of education on the probability
of a worker quitfing taking into account the better alternative opportunities available to the better
educated workers. Howevec.we areconcerned with explaining wage differences in the market, not at the
firm being studied, where there are no wage differences due to education differences. In the market•15-
alternative opportunities could also affect job satisfaction.For example, we would
expect workers that were employed at the time of application to havea significantly
higher level of job satisfaction (one reason they left theprevious job was the
anticipation of increased job satisfaction) and hence to be less likely toquit. There
are also job related characteristics, such as job complexity, that affectjob
satisfaction but not alternative opportunities.
Finally we would expect stick-to-itiveness (as measured byyears of education
and high school graduation), and whether the worker is marriedto impose
additional mobility costs. Those variables are notmultiplied by g(a,ô,fi0F). They
enter directly into the quit equation as elements of X3.13
As can be seen in Table 3A our major hypothesis is confirmed.High school
graduation has a strong negative effect on the probability of a workerquitting.
This effect is independent of the direct effect of schooling. Wecan reject the
hypothesis that the reason better educated individuals have lower quit propensities
is that they learned not to quit in school.
Insert Table 3A about here
equilibrium better educated workers have higher wages as well asbetter alternative opportunities, Itis
differencesin quitpropensities,not of theeftect ofalternative opportunities on quits, which contributes to
differences in the equilibrium wage at different education levels.
13. See Mincer (]978) for an analysis of the effect of marital status on workermobility.- 16-
Equation (9) was estimated by the method of maximum likelihood, using a
pooled samp]e from plants A and B. Individuals were omitted if they were laid-off
before being with the firm for six months and selection bias was avoided by also
omitting workers who would have been laid-off before six months had passed had
they not already quit. (All layoffs were made strictly by seniority). Because the
likelihood function is almost flat with respect to changes in 5offsetby
compensating changes in the vector of variables multiplied by 5,thestandard errors
of S and of the coefficients of variables multiplied by g(a,6,/30F)arehigh.
Although statistically insignificant, they have values consistent with the model.
Individuals such as white males that have better alternative opportunities are more
likely to quit these jobs; workers who were employed when they applied for these
jobs are less likely to quit. Similar confirmation was provided by the negative
value of Our estimates suggest that females in our sample anticipate spending
7 fewer years in the labor force than do males. This finding is consistent with
unpublished research b' Jacob Mincer, Using the P510 sample Mincer finds that
women spend roughly 25% less time in the labor force than do men. Finally the
similarity in the 'i'statisticsobtained using the gradient, hessian and White
methods suggests that the model is not grossly misspecified.
To obtain more precise estimates of the coefficients, and to make use of







That is, we impose the restrictions that r— i.05and that the effective
work-life of women is 25% shorter than that of men.
Equation (9a) was estimated using a probit estimation procedure. The
estimated coefficients, and the effect of a change in each independent variable on
the probability of a worker quitting are presented in Table 3B.
Insert Table 3B about here
Note that in Table 3B job complexity and match were not included as
independent variables. If job complexity and match are included as independent
variables when (9a) is estimated, the sample size falls to 1532 and the absolute
value of all the 'H statisticsalso falls. However, none of the results shown in
Table JB are significantly affected: high school graduation is estimated to
correspond to a reduction in the probability of the worker quitting of -.052 at a
10% quit probability and -.083 at a 20% quit probability. Similarly if quit
propensity is estimated separately for men and women in our sample, the
qualitative effects in Table 3B hold for each subsample.- 18-
We checked the finding that high school graduation significantly affects quit
propensities using the 1968-1982 PSID sample. We estimate that each year of
post—primary education has neither a statistically nor economically significant
effect on a worker's quit rate, while completion of high school is associated with a
reduction in the individuals quit rate of roughly one-third.
Insert Table 4 about here
2.2 Absenteeism
InAppendix A, we present a theoretical model that shows why differences in
expected absenteeism rates can significantly affect the wages of workers. In this
section. we estimate the discontinuities in expected absenteeism rates associated
with H.S. graduation for workers in our sample.
In estimating the determinants of absenteeism we assume that a worker is more
likely to be absent the higher is his level of job dissatisfaction, and the lower his
persistence. As in the quit equation, job satisfaction is measured by the elements
of X2. We use education and high school graduation as proxies for persistence—an
individual who had insufficient persistence to complete high school is likely to have
poorer than expected attendance habits. We shall assume that absenteeism (both
days and occasions of absenteeism as a percentage of possible days worked) is a
linear function of A'-,, our proxies for diligence, and a normally distributed error
term.19-
In the quit equation we were able toseparate the effect of education on job
satisfaction from its effec on stick-to-itiveness by arguing that job satisfaction has
a greater effect on the quit rates of workers with longer expected future work lives.
The education x g(a,5j30F)termcaptured the effect of education on quits that
was caused by its effect on either alternative opportunities or job satisfaction. This
option is not available to us in the absenteeism equations: workers are trading off
one period gains and losses from absences. Consequently, the estimated coefficients
on education and high school graduation could be estimating the effect of lower (or
higher) levels of job satisfaction of better educated workers on their absence rates.
However, the results from the previously estimated quit equations suggest this is
not happening.
As mentioned, two measures of absenteeism are used as dependent variables.
Percentage of days absent is estimated using a Tobit procedure.14
We calculated the percentage of days workers were absent during their first six
months on the job; however, because not all the workers in our sample completed
6 months of work those observations were weighted by the square root of the
number of days for which they were observed.
14. We are implicii]y assuming that discrete absenteeism data can be approximated by a continuous
distribution, and that the error term in the estimation equation is normally distributed but
truncated so that absenteeism rates that the model predicts would be negative are recorded as
zeros.- 20-
Insert Table 5abouthere
We also used occasions of absent as a dependent variable. In those calculations
we restricted ourselves to individuals who worked for 6 months, and used the
negative binomial procedure described by Hausman, Griliches and Hall (HGH).'5
Insert Table 6 about here
Whether days or occasions are used as a measure of absenteeism we find that
high school graduation has a negative effect on absenteeism. This effect is
statistically significant regardless of the estimation procedure used. On the other
hand education has a positive, albeit statistically insignificant, effect on
absenteeism. Thus, it seems unlikely that high school graduates learned in
secondary school the traits that gave them low rates of absenteeism. Instead, the
same unobserved characteristics that lead to successful completion of high school
seem to lead to low rates of absenteeism.
15. The implicit assumptions made by using the negative binomial model are that incidents of
absenteeism (several consecutive days absent are recorded as one incident) are generatedfroma
binomial distribution which, because of the large number of observations for each individual, can
be approximated by a Poisson arrival process; and that the X parameter which describes the
Poisson process has a gamma distribution across the population. HGH describe a maximum
likelihood procedure to compute the effect of various independent variables on A. (Because the
probability of being absent is a function of whether the worker was absent on the previous day.
the independence assumption required by the binomial distribution is inappropriate for modeling
the percentage of days absent. It seems more reasonable to expect incidents of absenteeism to
be independently distributed.)-2]-
2.3Output Per Hour
The finalindicator of performance explored was the logarithm of normalized
outputperhour during the worker'sfirstmonth at theplant. Aspreviously noted,
newly hired workers are randomly assignedtojobsandpaid piece-rate. We
assumethat output perhour is a linear function of observedcharacterisdcs.
including the match term described above.
Insert Table 7 about here
From Table 7 we see that matching better educated people, orhigh schoor
graduates, to more complex jobs (the match term) has neither a statistically, nor
economically, significant effort on output. This finding suggests that the pecuniary
reward to education for the workers in the sample is not due to skills learned in
school that help those workers learn complex production tasks.
The direct effect of education on output is marginally significant, but does not
seem large enough to explain the correlation between education and wages. In
Table 2 we computed the effect of education on the logarithm of their realwages
on their previous job for workers in Plant A. Our best estimate was that each year
of secondary education had a 4-5% effect on the pay of the workers in our sample.
On the other hand, restricting the sample to workers in that plant we find that each
year of education has only a I .3% effect on the output of workers in that plant.
This estimated effect is not statistically different from zero.- 22-
Figure2 describes the distribution of jobs in our sample according to the
number of weeks required to learn each job.
Insert Figure 2 about here
3. EFFECTS ON WAGES
A]though one shou]d be extremely cautious about generalizing the results in
Section 2 beyondour sampleof semi-skil]ed production workers, the PSID data
provides, evidence of the impact of a low quit propensity on the wage premium
received by high school graduates.
There is considerable evidence that during business slumps firms hoard workers:
pay wages above the value of the product of the workers. Implicit contract theory
maintains that these high levels of wages and employment are consequences of
optimal risk sharing between firms and workers. Consequently during business
slumps we would expect firms to benefit from (or be hurt less by) quits and unpaid
absences. Consequently, to obtain quantitative estimates of the effect of the low
quit propensity and low absenteeism of high school graduates on their wages, we
interacted county unemployment rates with high school graduation while estimiling
a wage equation for privately employed males in the PSID data set between 1968
and 1982. We included education, education squared, and education cubed as
independent variables to reduce the possible role of high school graduation in
approximating a precluded degree of curvature in the relationship between wages-23-
and education.
As a further check on possible non-linearitiesgenerating these results we
replacedthe dummyvariable for high school graduation first with, a dummy
variable for completion of 11tl grade and then witha dummy variable for
completion of 33thgrade.
Neither of these dummy variables were statistically significant. Thus the
results do not seem due to the dummy variable for completion ofhigh school
capturing some non-linearities in the relationship between calculation and wages.16
Insert Table 8 about here
As can be seen in Table 8, if the county unemployment rate iszero, graduation
from high school has roughly 4.4 times as great an effect onwages as does
completion of 11th grade. While, if the county unemployment rate is over 15%,
the wage premium received bv high school graduates disappears. At themean
county unemployment rate, completion of i 2th grade has roughly four times the
effect on wages as does completion of I 1th grade.
This pro-cyclical behavior of the wage premium for completion of high school is
especially surprising given the occupational distributions of high school dropouts
16. Nominal wages were used as a dependent variable with the natural logarithm of the C.P.I. as an
independent variable to avoid restricting the coefficient of the in C.P.1. to I.-24-
and high school graduates. High school dropouts are over represented among blue
collar workers: 54% of the blue collar workers in the PSID sample were high school
dropouts, while only 10% of the white collar workers were high school dropouts.
Raisian finds that the wages of blue collar workers relative to those of white collar
workers are procyclical.17 Hence the different occupations chosen by high school
graduates and high school dropouts would lead the wage premium for high school
graduation to behave counter-cyclically.18
3.1Corroborative Evidence
Ifour analysis were wrong and the effect of high school graduation on earning
had nothing to do with the lower quite propensities of high school graduates. then
previous quits would have the same effect on the wages of high school graduates as
on the wages of high school dropouts. Previous quits have no discernable effect on
the wages of high school dropouts but a large negative effect on the wages of high
school graduates.
Insert Table 9 about here
17. We used the same classification scheme as Raisian in determining which 2 digit occupations
were blue collar and which were white collar.
18. Note that the formu]ation we have chosen has the form In H' —X,$+ ,,,where,u,N(O,or).
Coleman has argued against assuming that m is distributed i.i.d. if one wishes to study cyclical
effects. He argues persuasively that a more reasonable model is In WXhfl+m, +11.
Consequently,the i"statisticsfor our OLS estimates of the cyclical variables should be viewed
with caution. (Most of the variance in county unemployment rates are due to cross sectional
rather than cyclical effects).-25-
The evidence in Table 9 suggests that high school graduation is used as a
screen for jobs in which a low quit propensity is highly valued. However.
graduation from high school may be only necessary, but not sufficient for obtaining
those jobs. In particular among experienced workers a low realized quit ratemay
also be required.
-
ThePSID also provides corroborative evidence that the discontinuous increase
in earnings associated with graduation from high school is not due to a
discontinuous increase in the cognitive skills of high school graduates.
In 1976 and 1978 respondents to the PSID were asked the training required for
an average worker to learn their job. Better educated individuals reported having
jobs requiring more training. However, after correcting for the continuous effect of
education, we did not find that high school graduates were matched with jobs
requiring more training. Since we previously found a large effect of high school
graduation on quit propensities and quit rates, it would appear that the major
determinant of whether individuals take jobs requiring significant amounts of
training is how well they benefit from training, nottheirquit propensities (this
interpretation is consistent with training being largely the acquisition of general,
not firm specific, human capital).
Insert Table 10 about here
Thus the discontinuous increase in earnings associated with high school- 26-
graduationdoes not seem to be due to the acquisition of skills that are
complementary with on-the-job training.
On the other hand, the evidence presented in Table 10 suggests that the
earnings gains associated with education are due, in part, to better educated
individuals having attributes that enhance their benefit from training.
Thus far we have not directly addressed the question of whether the evidence
we have presented supports a sorting rather than human capita] theoretic
explanation for the higher earnings of high school graduates. One of the reasons
that it is so difficult to distinguish between the two explanations is that both could
be based on unobserved (to the econometrician) attributes of individuals. In a pure
sorting model, although no ]earning occurs during the relevant course of schooling.
the same unobserved attributes that affect productivity also affect the private
return to schooling.In a human capital model, unobserved attributes could
indirectly affect productivity and affect the private return to schooling by affecting
the efficiency with which the individual learns. In that version of human capital
theory, some individuals go to school longer than others because they learn more in
school.
A low rate of absenteeism and a low quit propensity could directly be affecting
productivity (as in a sorting model). Or they could be correlated with the
efficiency with which an individual learns (as in a human capital model).
However, if high school graduates went to school longer than dropouts because
they learn more rapidly, and effectiveness of learning in school and learning on the- 27-
jobare positively correlated, then we would expect the high school graduatesto
have a comparative advantage at jobs requiringmore training: and, in the PSID. to
have jobs requiring more training.
As we've seen, high school graduates do not havea comparative advantage on
production jobs and they do not report having jobs requiring more training. Thus,
it seems unlikely that the discontinuity in earnings associated withgraduation from
high school is due to a discontinuous increase in the learning acquired by the high
school graduates, as would be implied by human capital theory.
4. SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS
As we discussed above, we have strong reasons for believing thatsample
selection bias is not a serious probJem for our analysis. However, to theextent
sample selection is a problem our results are stronger than would be indicated from
the estimated coefficients and "z"statistics.
Since only a trivial number of applicants were rejected for reasons other than
low scores on the dexterity test, we shall restrict the discussion in this section to the
biases introduced from the application decision of workers.
Consider an unobserved application equation. A worker applies for a job with
this firm if and only if
(iO)
where €1includesunobserved characteristics of a worker. Having applied and been
aer-epted at this job, the worker subsequently quits if and only if- 28-
(ii) > Ck'y>1)
andis absent if and on]y if
(13) X,/3, >€3LK7>
Becausebetter educated workers had higher wages on their previous jobs, and
generally have higher reservation wages when unemployed, we would expect the
coefficients on education and high school graduation in (10) to be negative. Since
(10) is not estimated. andeducation are negatively correlated.It seems
reasonable to expect that, at least for employed applicants, e is positively
correlated with e7 and ei:Aworker who was easily induced to leave his previous
job is likely to be easily induced to leave his current job, and a low level of
commitment to his job might also be expected to lead to a higher than expected
probability of being absent. Therefore, we expect c, and (3tobe negatively
correlated with education in equations (13) and (14). Hence, for our sample there
is an upward bias on the estimated coefficients on education and H.S. graduation in
the quit and absenteeism equations. resulting in an underestimate of the magnitude
of the negative correlation between H.S. graduation and the propensity to be
absent or to quit. (Because most firms pay higher wages to better educated
workers, they are not subject to this form of sample selection bias. In the market
equilibrium it is the unbiased correlation between education and performance that
determines the rate of return to education.)- 29-
5.REVIEW OF RESULTS
Recent large sample studies have shown returns to education in theregion of
5%. We find a similar rate of return for thepay on their previous job for workers
in our two samples. A large component of this rate of return is the discontinuous
increase in wages associated with high schoo] graduation.
Presumably the higher earnings of high school graduates are due to their higher
productivity relative to high school dropouts. We investigated four components of
productivity: output per hour, comparative advantage on more comp]ex task.
propensity to quit. and propensity to be absent.
High school graduation appeared to be uncorrelated with output per hour, and
high school graduates did not appear to have a comparative advantage on more
complex jobs. On the other hand, high school graduates were significantly less
likely to quit or to be absent. The wage premium received by high school
graduates in the PSID sample is pro-cyclical. We estimated that when the county
unemployment rate reaches 15% this wage premium vanishes. Consequently, if a
low quit propensity and a low rate of absenteeism are more valuable during booms
than slumps, these data suggest that a considerable portion of the estimated return
to high school graduation is due to unobserved traits that are associated with that
credential.
We also found that previous quits have a strong adverse effect on the earnings
of high school graduates, but not on the earnings of high school dropouts. This
difference in the impact of quits cii earnings is consistent with the high earnings of- 30-
highschool graduates being due to their lower quit propensities.
Finally, we found that high school graduates were not assigned to jobs requiring
more training than would be expected from a continuous relationship between
education and required training. If the same skills that enable individuals to learn
effectively in school also improve their learning ability on the job (as is indicated
by better educated workers having jobs that do require more training), these data
suggest that graduation from high school is not associated with more efficient
acquisition of human capital.
Consequently, the discontinuous increase in earnings associated with graduation
from high school seems due to unobserved attributes that are negatively correlated
with absenteeism and quit propensity, and are positively correlated with the
probability of the individual graduating high school.REFERENCES
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Mean Value of the Relevant Variable
Plant APlant BPlant C
9'c White .72 .76 NA
% Black .24 .20 NA
Age 24.6 25.3 26.7
Education 12.1 12.2 11.9
9 Employed at time of
application (1 if employed,
0 otherwise) .64 .29 .38
% Male .57 .19 .41
Married .43 .48 .42
Previous work
experience (in years) 3.54 NA NA
Weeks to learn job 7.5 5.1 11.7
Score on screws test 22.6 21.3 24.0
Score on pins test 22.4 23.5 NA
1st month output 111 63 105
% days absent 2.96 2.3 3.0
%occasions absent 1.2 1.1 1.12
Quit rate in first
six months on job 9.8% 18.2% 12.3%TABLE 2
LN HOURLY EARNINGS IN 1979
Current Population Survey Sample Versus Weiss Sample




Non-White -.070 -.073 -.027
(-7.14) (-5.24) (-1.52)
Female -.343 •.262 -.239
(-57.44) (-2] .86)(-14.17)
Education .047 .045 .185
(5.73) (3.46) (2.48)
(Education/I o,)2 .084 .035 -.570
(2.98) (.69) (-2,03)
Tenure .021 .012 .027
00.60) (4.42) (.707)
(Tenure/b)2 -.043 -.029 -.120
(-12.73) (-6.26) (-1.70)
Age-Educ.-6 .022 .014 .049
(11.96) (4.88) (4.03)
((Age-Educ.-6)/ 0)2 -.033 -.042 -0.60
(-15.84) (-6.73) (-5.45)
Educ, Times Tenure .038 .062 .0006
(2.98) (5.25) (.19)
Educ. Times (Age-Educ.-6) -.069 -.039 -.002
(-6.3) (-389) (2.30)
Married Dummy yes yes yes
Number of Observations 18.55] 18,551 1,251
.436 .324 1207
(The smaller R2 in column 3 compared with columns I and 2 is due, in part. to less variance in earnings
within the Weiss sample.)
Evaluating the effect ol additional year of education, tenure and experience at the mean values in each sample










•CPS data also has dummy variables for SMSA, region, occupation, industry, and either firm size or union
membership. whether or not the worker was employed pan-time, and unionization of industry.
Weiss data is from the only plant in this study for which wage data on the previous job is available. The
dependent variable is the logarithm of the wge their most recent job divi4ed by the mean wage in the
most recent previous pay economy at the time they held that job, or In . ontheir present job the lilt
average pay in U.S. at that date
time wages of all the workers of all the workers are approximately identical.TABLE3A
PROBABILITY OF QUITTING WITHIN FIRST SIX MONTHS ON THE JOB
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
Estimated Standard Errors
Coefficient ('C statistics below) *
or Gradient Hessian Whit&s
Indenendent Varjable** Value Method Method Method
6 .26 2.04 .61 .28
(-.13) (-.42) (-.91)
(effect of being female -6.81 42.3 10.6 4.19
on anticipated work-life) (-.16) (-.63) (-1.62)
H. S. Graduate -.342 .140 .135 .136
(-2.44) (-2.54) (-2.61)
College Graduate -.242 .367 .397 .444
(-.66) (-.62) (-.s9)
Education -.07 .171 .057 .035
(-.44) (-.67) (-.76)
g(a,c5,30F)x education .015 .143 .044 .029
(.11) (.34) (.53)
Married -.091 .078 .077 .077
(—1.16) (—1.18) (—1.17)
g(a.&$0F)X employed -.098 .774 .231 .107
atapplication (-.13) (-.43) (-.92)
Number of observations 2146
Log Likelihood -741.99
Other independent variables included scores on each half of the dexterity test,
race-location interactions, location effects, age and an intercept term. We used
three different methods for calculating the standard errors because there is no
consensus as to which is the correct technique. If the model is correctly specified,
the three methods give the same asymptotic estimates. The estimates we obtain
are sufficiently similar to provide some confidence that the model is not grossly
misspecified. Computational costs precluded performirg the model specification
test suggested by White.
*We are using the term t' statistic loosely, to refer to the estimated coefficient divided by the standard
error.TABLE 3B
PROBABILITY OF QUITTING
WITHIN FIRST SEX MONTHS*
Quit Probability
from a I unit
change in the
Independent Variable Evaluated at
cQ.cmcisuL C.1ninic. _.w.LEr2babi1ity of
10% 20%
Intercept -.922 -1.54
H.S. Graduate -.341 -2.54 -.059 -.096
CollegeGraduate -.280 -.72 -.049 -.078
Education -.]06 -1.32 -.019 -.030
Married -.097 -1.26 -.017 -.027
h(a,ô,yF) x education .0055 1.45.00097 .0015
h(a,6.-yF)x age -00029 -.32 -.000052 -.000083
h(a,&-yF)x male .0012 .16.00022 .00034
h (a,ô,F) x white x south .068 4.58 .012 .019
h (a,ô,F) x south -.036 -2.34-.0062 -.0099
h (a,ó,yE) x white x midwest .0061 1.00 .0011 .0017
h (a,o,*yF) x employed at -.0023 -4.95 -.0040 -.0064
application
Ii (a.6,-1F) X pins section .00020 .34.000035 .000056
of dexterity test
Ii (a,5,F) X screws section .00094 1.94.00016 .00026
of dexterity test
Number of Observations 2146
-y set equal to -.25, 5 set equal to .05.
.124 of observations had Q= 1;the mean of h (a,5,'-F) is 16.12
•Estimated using Hessian method.TABLE 4
QUITS PER YEAR FOR MALE PRIVATE SECTOR
EMPLOYEES IN PSID SAMPLE 1968.82*



















Mean Cty Unemp. minus -.003
Mean Nat. Unemp (-1.79)
Number of Observations 3781
.16
Mean Quits per year .092
cia@bservitlon wis 1qhted by the squire root of the nslber of years the Individual was In the simple-
Other Independent variables were an Intercept term, end 8 locational dany variebles.TABLE 5
DAYS ABSENT AS A PERCENTAGE
























Number of Observations 1890
Log Likelihood -4781.2
•The data for Tables 6 and 7 come from at] locations of the firm, rather than the two included in the quit
equations.
-
Each observation was weighted by the square rt of the number of days worked. Dummy variables for the
locations of the plants, the scores on the screws section of the dexterity test and race-location interactions at
the two plants at which we had race data were also included as independent variable,TABLE 6
OCCASIONS ABSENT DURING THE
FIRST SIX MONTH ON THE JOB
Negative BinomialModel




















Employed at Application -.14
(-2.72)
Number of Observations 1565
Log Likelihood 1333.5
*Other independent variables were location, and score on the screws section of the dexterity test, and race-
location interactions for the two plants at which race data was available.
Standard errors were calculated using the Hessian method.TABLE 7
NORMALIZED FIRST MONTH OUTPUT
Estimated by Ordinary Least Squares
(ut" statistics in parentheses)
Independent Variables* CoefficientCoefficientCoefficient
Intercept 67.36 69.05 71.63
(5.80) (6.24) (7.14)
Male 8.91 8.87 8.87
(5.81) (5.80) (5.80)
Age -.11 -.11 -.11
(—1.15) (—1.16) (-1.16)
Education 1.36 1.34 1.33
(1.63) (1.61) (1.59)




Job Complex x H.S. grad. -2.64 -1.55
(-.73) (-.55)
CollegeGraduate -12.96 -13.12 -13.03
(-2.09) (-2.11) (-2.10)
Married 4.01 4.02 4.01
(2.98) (2.98) (2.98)
Score on .22 .22 .21
Dexterity Test (1.52) (1.53) (i .53)
Job Complexity** 7.82 6.98 5.63
(2.45) (2.60) (5.26)
Employed at Application 1.48 1.45 1.48
(1.08) (1.06) (1.08)
Number of Observations 1859 1859 1959
Multiple R-Square .382 .382 .382
•Other independent variables were location dummies.
-. The statistically significant coefficients for job complexity suggest thattheindustrial engineers
overestimate the difficulty of performing complex jobs.TABLE 8
LN WAGES OF MALE PRIVATESECTOR EMPLOYEESIN PSID
SAMPLE 1968-82
(t" statistics in parenthesis)
























county unemployment rate (-3.86)
College Graduate .0082
(.2 9)
Ln of C.P.1. 1.03
(7.51)
Mean Cty Unemp. minus .0087
Mean Nat. Unemp. (2.92)
Number of observations 9942
• Other independent variables were 8 location dummy variables andan intercept term.
Note the estimated cocificient here is consistent with Robert Hall's observation that areas with high
unemployment rates have higher than average wages.TABLE 9
LNWAGES OF MALE PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYEES INPSID
SAMPLE 1968-82











H.S. x countyunemploymentrate -.0088
(-3.62)
Quits per year observed •.oi 3
(-.49)
H.S.graduate times -.080
NumberQuits per year in sample (-2.60)
Numberof observations 13,604
*Other independent variables included an intercept term, the county and national unemployment rates. In
C.P.I., marital status, race, union membership, disabled, pan time, and a dummy variable for IsIyear on
the job.TABLE 10
YEARS OF TRAINING REQUIRED FOR JOB IN1976-1978
PSID SAMPLE,



























Numbers of observations 9941
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In evaluating the cost of absenteeism to firms, the nature of the production
process is critical. Traditional economic analyses of absenteeism assume a worke(s
marginal product is equal to his wage and the cost of absenteeism is the wage of
the worker. In this section we consider the opposite polar case where the
production process requires kworkersto operate. If more than kworkersare
present, the extra workers are redundant, they do not increase output. If fewer
than Icworkersappear, output is zero. To simplify the notation, we assume output
is linear in the number of workers, and normalize the value of output to be equal to
k.Thenumber of workers hired is denoted by n, the wage of each worker by w,
the probability that a worker appears for work by p. and the expected profit of a
firm employing n workers by ,r&1). We let P(S k)denotethe probability that
at least k workers are present when n workers are hired. Finally, we assume that
workers are not paid if they are absent (this assumption is made so that we can
focus on the indirect costs of absenteeism, rather than the direct cost of paying for
an absent worker).
ir(n)kP(S k)pw. -
Theexpected marginal product of the n+1 worker is
k) —P(S k)].
Thenet expected value of the marginal worker isA-2
t(n+1) —2r(n) — kP(s1) k) —(n+i)pw
—kP(S,sk)+ npw,
—p/Zr(S,1 )k—i)+(i—p)1ZP(Sk) —kP(S?k) —pw,




Theexpected value of the marginal worker is the probability that the worker is
decisive (enables the plant to operate) times the value of theproduction process,
minus that worker's expected cost to the firm.
A firm increases the number of workers it employs so long as (Al) ispositive; it
chooses the smallest n such that
(A2) p/c(j)jp(l—p)'"—pw C0,wherej —k—1
if we consider the case where workers are paid even if they are absent, the







Below, we present an example showing the effect of changes in (I-p), the
probability of a worker being absent, on the profitability of the firm. As that
example illustrates, even if firms do not pay workers when they are absent, a given
change in the probability of a worker being present can have a more thanA-3
proportional effect on the equilibrium wage of the worker. Consequently traits that
are correlated with low absenteeism rates may be significantly rewarded in the
labor market.
To illustrate the effect of absenteeism on the equilibrium value of a worker to
the firm let us consider a production process which requires 20 workers to operate,
generates $10,000 of income per day if it operates, and has a fixed cost of $5,000
per day whether it operates or not. We shall assume workers are not paid if they
are absent. In equilibrium, if the probability of a worker being absent is known by
all employers, firms compete for workers so that wages are bid up to the level
where each production process earns zero profits, and all the workers at a given
plant have the same absenteeism rate, we find the following relationship between
absenteeism and wages:A -4
Profit Maximizing
Probability of Number of Equilibrium
Being Absent Employees Daily Wage





















Suggesting that even if employees are not paid when they are absent, in
competitive markets employers would pay higher wages to workers with lower
probabilities of being absent.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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